feat: adopt smolmail protocol 1.1, adaptive nav shell, and server mail retention

This commit is contained in:
randogoth 2026-09-27 11:07:11 +03:00
parent eaaa3f2ede
commit c693e6fcb9
27 changed files with 1190 additions and 592 deletions

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// Smol Mail protocol, version 1 (../smolmail SPEC.md): addresses, sealed and
// signed envelopes, body frontmatter, key rotation, and the framed request
// and response bodies of the five operations.
// Smol Mail protocol, version 1.1 (../smolmail SPEC.md): addresses, sealed
// and signed envelopes, body frontmatter, key rotation, accept tokens, and
// the framed request and response bodies of the five operations.
import "dart:math";
import "dart:typed_data";
@ -10,9 +10,11 @@ import "package:smol_mail/smol/errors.dart";
import "package:smol_mail/smol/noise.dart";
const defaultPort = 1961;
const keyLen = 32, sigLen = 64, certLen = 136, idLen = 16;
const keyLen = 32, sigLen = 64, certLen = 200, idLen = 32, tokenLen = 32;
const maxFrame = 1 << 20, noisePayload = 65535 - 16, padTo = 1024;
const envelopeHeader = 69, payloadHeader = 45, maxChain = 16;
const maxSkew = 86400; // §5.3: how far ahead of our clock a payload may be dated
const flagRequests = 0x01; // §6.1: set when a FETCH record missed an accept token
const _frontmatterMax = 4096, _frontmatterKeys = 64;
const opAuth = 0x00, opResolve = 0x01, opSend = 0x02, opFetch = 0x03,
@ -32,6 +34,10 @@ final _label = (
msg: utf8Bytes("smolmail/1 msg"),
id: utf8Bytes("smolmail/1 id"),
rotate: utf8Bytes("smolmail/1 rotate"),
identity: utf8Bytes("smolmail/1 identity"),
accept: utf8Bytes("smolmail/1 accept"),
mac: utf8Bytes("smolmail/1 mac"),
register: utf8Bytes("smolmail/1 register"),
);
// --- encoding helpers ---------------------------------------------------------
@ -139,11 +145,44 @@ SmolIdentity identityFromSeed(Uint8List seed) {
SmolIdentity newIdentity() => identityFromSeed(randomBytes(keyLen));
// §2: the only secret a user holds. Everything else — every rotation index's
// signing seed, and the accept key — is derived from it with HKDF.
Uint8List identitySeed(Uint8List master, int index) =>
hkdfSha256(master, Uint8List(0), concat([_label.identity, u32be(index)]));
Uint8List acceptKeyFor(Uint8List master) =>
hkdfSha256(master, Uint8List(0), _label.accept);
// §5.8: the token this account issues to one correspondent, independent of
// the rotation index so it survives the owner's key rotation.
Uint8List tokenFor(Uint8List master, Uint8List correspondentIdentity) =>
hmacSha256(acceptKeyFor(master), correspondentIdentity);
// §5.8: what a sender attaches to SEND to reach the recipient's main tier.
Uint8List acceptMac(Uint8List token, Uint8List id) =>
hmacSha256(token, concat([_label.mac, id]));
// --- addressing (§3) -----------------------------------------------------------
final _address =
RegExp(r"^(?<user>[a-z0-9._-]{1,63})@(?<host>[^/:]+)(?::(?<port>\d+))?$");
const _separators = "._-";
// §3: alphanumeric at both ends, never two separators in a row.
bool validUsername(String name) {
if (name.isEmpty) return false;
if (_separators.contains(name[0]) || _separators.contains(name[name.length - 1])) {
return false;
}
for (var i = 0; i < name.length - 1; i++) {
if (_separators.contains(name[i]) && _separators.contains(name[i + 1])) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
class SmolAddress {
final String user;
final String host;
@ -179,8 +218,9 @@ SmolAddress parseAddress(String text) {
if (m == null) throw SmolError("'$text' is not a valid address");
final user = m.namedGroup("user")!;
final host = m.namedGroup("host")!;
if ("._-".contains(user[0]) || "._-".contains(user[user.length - 1])) {
throw SmolError("$user may not begin or end with a separator");
if (!validUsername(user)) {
throw SmolError("$user must begin and end with a letter or digit "
"and may not contain two separators in a row");
}
final portText = m.namedGroup("port");
final port = portText != null ? int.parse(portText) : defaultPort;
@ -189,8 +229,9 @@ SmolAddress parseAddress(String text) {
// --- message format (§5) -------------------------------------------------------
Uint8List messageId(List<int> envelope) =>
sha256(concat([_label.id, envelope])).sublist(0, idLen);
// §5.4: derived from the envelope so no sender can choose it; used whole,
// nothing truncates it.
Uint8List messageId(List<int> envelope) => sha256(concat([_label.id, envelope]));
class OpenedMessage {
final Uint8List sender;
@ -288,6 +329,9 @@ OpenedMessage unseal(List<SmolIdentity> identities, Uint8List envelope) {
signature)) {
throw const SmolError("signature does not verify");
}
if (when > nowSeconds() + maxSkew) {
throw const SmolError("payload is dated in the future");
}
return OpenedMessage(sender, when, body, messageId(envelope));
}
@ -304,7 +348,8 @@ class Frontmatter {
// A flat `Key: value` block, deliberately not YAML. Any malformed line
// invalidates the whole block, which is then returned as ordinary body text:
// frontmatter fails closed toward display, never toward silent discard.
// frontmatter fails closed toward display, never toward silent discard. Keys
// are compared case-insensitively (§5.5), so they are kept lowercased.
Frontmatter parseFrontmatter(String text) {
if (!text.startsWith("---\n")) return Frontmatter(const {}, text);
final lines = text.split("\n");
@ -327,7 +372,7 @@ Frontmatter parseFrontmatter(String text) {
return Frontmatter(const {}, text);
}
// first occurrence wins
fields.putIfAbsent(head, () => line.substring(colon + 1).trim());
fields.putIfAbsent(head.toLowerCase(), () => line.substring(colon + 1).trim());
}
return Frontmatter(fields, rest);
}
@ -343,35 +388,45 @@ String buildFrontmatter(Map<String, String> fields, String body) {
// --- key rotation (§7) ---------------------------------------------------------
Uint8List makeCert(SmolIdentity oldIdentity, Uint8List newSeed, [int? when]) {
final newPub = ed25519PublicKey(newSeed);
// §7: old_pub 32 || new_pub 32 || time 8 || sig_old 64 || sig_new 64. Both
// keys sign, so the old key alone cannot hand the username to a key nobody
// controls; the username is covered but not carried, so a verifier always
// supplies the one it is checking.
Uint8List makeCert(
String username, SmolIdentity oldIdentity, Uint8List newSeed, [int? when]) {
final newIdentity = identityFromSeed(newSeed);
final time = i64be(BigInt.from(when ?? nowSeconds()));
final signed = concat(
[_label.rotate, utf8Bytes(username), oldIdentity.publicKey, newIdentity.publicKey, time]);
return concat([
oldIdentity.publicKey,
newPub,
newIdentity.publicKey,
time,
ed25519Sign(oldIdentity.seed,
concat([_label.rotate, oldIdentity.publicKey, newPub, time])),
ed25519Sign(oldIdentity.seed, signed),
ed25519Sign(newIdentity.seed, signed),
]);
}
// Accept a key change only when a signed chain leads from the key we hold to
// the one the server now returns (§7).
bool walkChain(Uint8List pinned, Uint8List current, List<Uint8List> chain) {
// the one the server now returns, both keys signing each link (§7).
bool walkChain(
String username, Uint8List pinned, Uint8List current, List<Uint8List> chain) {
if (timingSafeEqual(pinned, current)) return true;
if (chain.isEmpty || chain.length > maxChain) return false;
var key = pinned;
var started = false;
for (final cert in chain) {
final old = cert.sublist(0, 32), next = cert.sublist(32, 64);
final when = cert.sublist(64, 72), sig = cert.sublist(72);
final when = cert.sublist(64, 72);
final sigOld = cert.sublist(72, 136), sigNew = cert.sublist(136, 200);
if (!started) {
if (!timingSafeEqual(old, key)) continue; // a link predating the key we hold
started = true;
} else if (!timingSafeEqual(old, key)) {
return false; // the chain is not continuous
}
if (!ed25519Verify(old, concat([_label.rotate, old, next, when]), sig)) {
final signed = concat([_label.rotate, utf8Bytes(username), old, next, when]);
if (!ed25519Verify(old, signed, sigOld) || !ed25519Verify(next, signed, sigNew)) {
return false;
}
key = next;
@ -482,18 +537,27 @@ void expectOk(int status, String what) {
}
// §4 session authentication: sign the handshake hash, which binds the
// signature to this session's server ephemeral and cannot be replayed.
Future<void> authenticate(
Session session, Uint8List handshakeHash, String username, SmolIdentity identity) async {
// signature to this session's server ephemeral and cannot be replayed, and
// push the accept token set (§5.8). `sync = 0` leaves the server's stored set
// untouched and `tokens` MUST then be empty; `sync = 1` replaces it exactly.
// Returns the number of accept tokens the server now holds.
Future<int> authenticate(Session session, Uint8List handshakeHash, String username,
SmolIdentity identity, {required int sync, List<Uint8List> tokens = const []}) async {
final name = utf8Bytes(username);
if (name.length > 255) throw const SmolError("username too long");
if (tokens.length > 0xffff) throw const SmolError("too many accept tokens for one AUTH");
final body = concat([
Uint8List.fromList([name.length]),
name,
identity.publicKey,
ed25519Sign(identity.seed, concat([_label.auth, handshakeHash])),
Uint8List.fromList([sync]),
u16be(tokens.length),
...tokens,
]);
expectOk((await session.call(opAuth, body)).status, "authentication");
final response = await session.call(opAuth, body);
expectOk(response.status, "authentication");
return Reader(response.body).u16();
}
class Resolved {
@ -516,8 +580,14 @@ Future<Resolved> resolveOp(Session session, String user) async {
List.generate(r.u8(), (_) => r.take(certLen)));
}
Future<Uint8List> sendOp(Session session, Uint8List envelope) async {
final response = await session.call(opSend, envelope);
// §5.8: [mac] is the sender's proof of an accept token, 0 or 32 bytes.
Future<Uint8List> sendOp(Session session, Uint8List envelope, {Uint8List? mac}) async {
final macBytes = mac ?? Uint8List(0);
if (macBytes.isNotEmpty && macBytes.length != tokenLen) {
throw const SmolError("accept MAC must be $tokenLen bytes");
}
final body = concat([Uint8List.fromList([macBytes.length]), macBytes, envelope]);
final response = await session.call(opSend, body);
expectOk(response.status, "sending");
return response.body.length == idLen
? response.body
@ -527,19 +597,27 @@ Future<Uint8List> sendOp(Session session, Uint8List envelope) async {
class FetchedRecord {
final Uint8List id;
final int receivedAt;
final int flags;
final Uint8List envelope;
const FetchedRecord(this.id, this.receivedAt, this.envelope);
const FetchedRecord(this.id, this.receivedAt, this.flags, this.envelope);
// §6.1: bit 0 is set when the message arrived without a matching accept token.
bool get isRequest => flags & flagRequests != 0;
}
Future<List<FetchedRecord>> fetchOp(Session session) async {
final response = await session.call(opFetch);
// §6.1: pages forward from a cursor; an all-zero id starts at the beginning.
Future<List<FetchedRecord>> fetchOp(
Session session, int afterReceivedAt, Uint8List afterId) async {
final body = concat([i64be(BigInt.from(afterReceivedAt)), afterId]);
final response = await session.call(opFetch, body);
expectOk(response.status, "fetching");
final r = Reader(response.body);
return List.generate(r.u16(), (_) {
final id = r.take(idLen);
final receivedAt = r.i64();
return FetchedRecord(id, receivedAt, r.take(r.u32()));
final flags = r.u8();
return FetchedRecord(id, receivedAt, flags, r.take(r.u32()));
});
}
@ -558,9 +636,13 @@ class RegisterOptions {
const RegisterOptions({this.token = "", this.cert});
}
Future<void> registerOp(
Session session, String username, SmolIdentity identity,
[RegisterOptions opts = const RegisterOptions()]) async {
// §6.1: the signature is proof of possession, bound to the server that will
// store the binding so it cannot be replayed to another server.
Uint8List registerSigned(Uint8List serverStatic, String username, Uint8List identity) =>
concat([_label.register, serverStatic, utf8Bytes(username), identity]);
Future<void> registerOp(Session session, Uint8List serverStatic, String username,
SmolIdentity identity, [RegisterOptions opts = const RegisterOptions()]) async {
final name = utf8Bytes(username);
final tokenBytes = utf8Bytes(opts.token);
final cert = opts.cert ?? Uint8List(0);
@ -571,6 +653,7 @@ Future<void> registerOp(
Uint8List.fromList([name.length]),
name,
identity.publicKey,
ed25519Sign(identity.seed, registerSigned(serverStatic, username, identity.publicKey)),
Uint8List.fromList([tokenBytes.length]),
tokenBytes,
Uint8List.fromList([cert.length]),