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Google requires OAuth for calendar access; app passwords stopped working for CalDAV, CardDAV and IMAP in March 2025, so there is no simpler path to offer. - Authorisation code flow over a loopback redirect, which is what Google supports for desktop clients now the copy-paste flow is gone, with PKCE so an intercepted code is useless without the verifier. Only the refresh token is persisted, 0600, in the state directory. - An expired grant is reported as itself: a consent screen still in Testing has its refresh tokens expired after 7 days, and "run calcalist google login" is more use than Google's bare invalid_grant. - doctor reports whether each Google endpoint is still authorised, since an installation that worked last week can stop with nothing having changed here. A webcal URL may now come from a command instead of the config. Google's secret iCal address grants read access to a whole calendar to anyone holding it, so writing it into a file described as portable and secret-free was a contradiction. Fixed a serious defect in the first draft of this module: random_token used fs::read on /dev/urandom, which reads to end of file. /dev/urandom has no end, so it allocated until the machine ran out of memory — it took the editor down with it. It now reads exactly 32 bytes, and a randomness failure is fatal rather than falling back to the clock, since a guessable state or PKCE verifier defeats the point of having them. Verified end to end against a live Posteo CalDAV calendar: pimsync validated the generated config against the real server, 58 events from a public feed were mirrored and pushed, and a second run was a no-op. 97 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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138 B
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7 lines
138 B
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/target
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/.devbox
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/result
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# OAuth client files and any other credentials must never be committed.
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client_secret_*.json
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*.credentials.json
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