//! OAuth 2.0 for an installed application.
//!
//! Google's Calendar API requires OAuth; there is no password to hand over. The
//! authorisation code is collected over a loopback redirect, which is the flow
//! Google supports for desktop clients since the copy-paste flow was withdrawn.
//! PKCE is used as well, so a code intercepted on the loopback interface is
//! useless without the verifier.
//!
//! Only the refresh token is persisted, in the state directory with owner-only
//! permissions. It never enters the portable configuration.

use std::fs;
use std::io::{BufRead, BufReader, Read, Write};
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr, TcpListener, TcpStream};
use std::os::unix::fs::{OpenOptionsExt, PermissionsExt};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Command;
use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use thiserror::Error;

const AUTH_ENDPOINT: &str = "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth";
const TOKEN_ENDPOINT: &str = "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token";

/// Read and write access to calendars. Google classes this as sensitive, which
/// is why the consent screen needs publishing before refresh tokens stop
/// expiring after seven days.
pub const SCOPE: &str = "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar";

/// Refresh a little early, so a token cannot expire mid-cycle.
const EXPIRY_MARGIN: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);

#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum AuthError {
    #[error("could not run the secret command `{command}`: {source}")]
    SecretCommand {
        command: String,
        #[source]
        source: std::io::Error,
    },
    #[error("the secret command `{command}` failed: {message}")]
    SecretFailed { command: String, message: String },
    #[error("endpoint `{0}` has no client_secret_command, which Google's OAuth flow requires")]
    NoClientSecret(String),
    #[error("no endpoint named `{0}` in the configuration")]
    UnknownEndpoint(String),
    #[error("endpoint `{endpoint}` is a {kind} endpoint, not a Google one")]
    NotGoogle { endpoint: String, kind: String },
    #[error("the client_secret_command for `{0}` produced nothing")]
    EmptyClientSecret(String),
    #[error("could not listen on a loopback port: {0}")]
    Listen(#[source] std::io::Error),
    #[error("could not read randomness from /dev/urandom: {0}")]
    Randomness(#[source] std::io::Error),
    #[error("the browser did not complete authorisation: {0}")]
    Redirect(String),
    #[error("authorisation was refused: {0}")]
    Denied(String),
    #[error("the redirect did not match the request; authorisation was abandoned")]
    StateMismatch,
    #[error("token request failed: {0}")]
    Token(String),
    #[error(
        "the stored authorisation for `{endpoint}` is no longer accepted by Google. \
         An app whose consent screen is still in Testing has its refresh tokens expired \
         after 7 days. Run `calcalist google login {endpoint}` to authorise again."
    )]
    Expired { endpoint: String },
    #[error(
        "Google returned no refresh token; re-run after removing calcalist from your account's third-party access, so consent is asked for again"
    )]
    NoRefreshToken,
    #[error("endpoint `{0}` has not been authorised; run `calcalist google login {0}`")]
    NotAuthorised(String),
    #[error(
        "endpoint `{endpoint}` names account `{account}`, which has not been authorised; \
         run `calcalist google login {endpoint}`"
    )]
    UnknownAccount { endpoint: String, account: String },
    #[error(
        "endpoint `{endpoint}` does not say which Google account it belongs to, and calcalist \
         is logged in to several ({accounts}). Add `account = \"…\"` to the endpoint."
    )]
    AmbiguousAccount { endpoint: String, accounts: String },
    #[error(
        "the authorisation stored for account `{account}` was issued to a different OAuth \
         client than endpoint `{endpoint}` configures; run `calcalist google login {endpoint}`"
    )]
    ClientMismatch { endpoint: String, account: String },
    #[error("could not access {path}: {source}")]
    Io {
        path: PathBuf,
        #[source]
        source: std::io::Error,
    },
    #[error("could not parse the stored token at {path}: {source}")]
    Parse {
        path: PathBuf,
        #[source]
        source: serde_json::Error,
    },
}

/// What is persisted between runs. The access token is cached only to avoid a
/// refresh on every command; the refresh token is the durable credential.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct StoredToken {
    pub refresh_token: String,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub access_token: Option<String>,
    /// Unix seconds at which `access_token` stops being usable.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub expires_at: u64,
    /// The account this authorisation belongs to. Absent in files written
    /// before authorisations were shared between endpoints.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub account: Option<String>,
    /// The OAuth client the refresh token was issued to. A refresh token is
    /// only valid for the client that obtained it, so a changed `client_id`
    /// has to be caught here rather than as an opaque `invalid_grant`.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub client_id: Option<String>,
}

impl StoredToken {
    fn usable_access_token(&self) -> Option<&str> {
        let now = unix_now() + EXPIRY_MARGIN.as_secs();
        self.access_token
            .as_deref()
            .filter(|_| self.expires_at > now)
    }
}

/// Where an authorisation lives, keyed by the account it was granted for.
///
/// An authorisation covers every calendar the account can see, so two endpoints
/// on one account share this file and only one of them ever has to log in.
pub fn account_token_path(state_dir: &Path, account: &str) -> PathBuf {
    state_dir
        .join("google")
        .join("accounts")
        .join(format!("{}.json", sanitise(account)))
}

/// Where an endpoint's refresh token used to live, before authorisations were
/// keyed by account. Still read, so an existing installation keeps working
/// until its next login moves it across.
pub fn legacy_token_path(state_dir: &Path, endpoint_id: &str) -> PathBuf {
    state_dir.join("google").join(format!("{endpoint_id}.json"))
}

/// Keeps an account name to one harmless path segment.
fn sanitise(account: &str) -> String {
    account
        .chars()
        .map(|ch| match ch {
            'a'..='z' | 'A'..='Z' | '0'..='9' | '-' | '_' | '.' | '@' => ch,
            _ => '_',
        })
        .collect()
}

/// Every account calcalist currently holds an authorisation for.
pub fn authorised_accounts(state_dir: &Path) -> Vec<String> {
    let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(state_dir.join("google").join("accounts")) else {
        return Vec::new();
    };
    let mut accounts: Vec<String> = entries
        .flatten()
        .filter_map(|entry| load_token(&entry.path()).ok().flatten())
        .filter_map(|token| token.account)
        .collect();
    accounts.sort();
    accounts.dedup();
    accounts
}

/// Picks the stored authorisation an endpoint should use.
///
/// The endpoint may name its account outright. Failing that, an authorisation
/// left over from the per-endpoint scheme is honoured, and then a single
/// account is taken to be the one meant — which is the ordinary case, and what
/// makes a second endpoint on the same account need no login of its own.
fn resolve_token(
    state_dir: &Path,
    endpoint_id: &str,
    account: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(PathBuf, StoredToken), AuthError> {
    if let Some(account) = account {
        let path = account_token_path(state_dir, account);
        let stored = load_token(&path)?.ok_or_else(|| AuthError::UnknownAccount {
            endpoint: endpoint_id.to_string(),
            account: account.to_string(),
        })?;
        return Ok((path, stored));
    }

    let legacy = legacy_token_path(state_dir, endpoint_id);
    if let Some(stored) = load_token(&legacy)? {
        return Ok((legacy, stored));
    }

    let accounts = authorised_accounts(state_dir);
    match accounts.as_slice() {
        [] => Err(AuthError::NotAuthorised(endpoint_id.to_string())),
        [only] => {
            let path = account_token_path(state_dir, only);
            let stored = load_token(&path)?.ok_or_else(|| AuthError::UnknownAccount {
                endpoint: endpoint_id.to_string(),
                account: only.clone(),
            })?;
            Ok((path, stored))
        }
        several => Err(AuthError::AmbiguousAccount {
            endpoint: endpoint_id.to_string(),
            accounts: several.join(", "),
        }),
    }
}

/// Runs an external command and returns its first line of output.
///
/// Secrets are fetched this way rather than stored, so the configuration file
/// stays portable and free of credentials.
pub fn run_secret_command(command: &str) -> Result<String, AuthError> {
    let output = Command::new("sh")
        .arg("-c")
        .arg(command)
        .output()
        .map_err(|source| AuthError::SecretCommand {
            command: command.to_string(),
            source,
        })?;
    if !output.status.success() {
        return Err(AuthError::SecretFailed {
            command: command.to_string(),
            message: String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim().to_string(),
        });
    }
    let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
    Ok(text.lines().next().unwrap_or_default().trim().to_string())
}

/// Everything needed to talk to Google for one endpoint.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Credentials {
    pub client_id: String,
    pub client_secret: String,
}

/// Resolves an endpoint's OAuth client, running its secret command to fetch the
/// client secret. The secret is never written to the configuration.
pub fn credentials_for(
    config: &crate::config::Config,
    endpoint_id: &str,
) -> Result<Credentials, AuthError> {
    let endpoint = config
        .endpoint(endpoint_id)
        .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::UnknownEndpoint(endpoint_id.to_string()))?;
    let crate::config::EndpointKind::Google {
        client_id,
        client_secret_command,
        ..
    } = &endpoint.kind
    else {
        return Err(AuthError::NotGoogle {
            endpoint: endpoint_id.to_string(),
            kind: endpoint.kind.kind_name().to_string(),
        });
    };
    let command = client_secret_command
        .as_deref()
        .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::NoClientSecret(endpoint_id.to_string()))?;
    let client_secret = run_secret_command(command)?;
    if client_secret.is_empty() {
        return Err(AuthError::EmptyClientSecret(endpoint_id.to_string()));
    }
    Ok(Credentials {
        client_id: client_id.clone(),
        client_secret,
    })
}

/// Obtains an access token, refreshing the stored one when it has expired.
pub fn access_token(
    state_dir: &Path,
    endpoint_id: &str,
    account: Option<&str>,
    credentials: &Credentials,
) -> Result<String, AuthError> {
    let (path, mut stored) = resolve_token(state_dir, endpoint_id, account)?;
    if let Some(issued_to) = &stored.client_id
        && *issued_to != credentials.client_id
    {
        return Err(AuthError::ClientMismatch {
            endpoint: endpoint_id.to_string(),
            account: stored.account.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "?".to_string()),
        });
    }

    if let Some(token) = stored.usable_access_token() {
        return Ok(token.to_string());
    }
    let refreshed = post_token(&[
        ("client_id", &credentials.client_id),
        ("client_secret", &credentials.client_secret),
        ("refresh_token", &stored.refresh_token),
        ("grant_type", "refresh_token"),
    ])
    .map_err(|error| match error {
        AuthError::Token(message) if message.contains("invalid_grant") => AuthError::Expired {
            endpoint: endpoint_id.to_string(),
        },
        other => other,
    })?;
    stored.access_token = Some(refreshed.access_token.clone());
    stored.expires_at = unix_now() + refreshed.expires_in;
    save_token(&path, &stored)?;
    Ok(refreshed.access_token)
}

/// Walks the user through authorisation and stores the resulting refresh token.
pub fn login(
    state_dir: &Path,
    endpoint_id: &str,
    credentials: &Credentials,
) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
    let listener =
        TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 0))).map_err(AuthError::Listen)?;
    let port = listener.local_addr().map_err(AuthError::Listen)?.port();
    let redirect_uri = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}");

    let state = random_token()?;
    let verifier = random_token()?;
    let challenge = pkce_challenge(&verifier);

    let url = format!(
        "{AUTH_ENDPOINT}?client_id={}&redirect_uri={}&response_type=code&scope={}\
         &access_type=offline&prompt=consent&state={}&code_challenge={}&code_challenge_method=S256",
        encode(&credentials.client_id),
        encode(&redirect_uri),
        encode(SCOPE),
        encode(&state),
        encode(&challenge),
    );

    println!("Open this URL to authorise calcalist:\n\n{url}\n");
    open_in_browser(&url);
    println!("Waiting for the redirect on {redirect_uri} ...");

    let code = wait_for_code(&listener, &state)?;
    let issued = post_token(&[
        ("code", &code),
        ("client_id", &credentials.client_id),
        ("client_secret", &credentials.client_secret),
        ("redirect_uri", &redirect_uri),
        ("grant_type", "authorization_code"),
        ("code_verifier", &verifier),
    ])?;
    let refresh_token = issued.refresh_token.ok_or(AuthError::NoRefreshToken)?;

    // Which account consented is not in the token response, but the primary
    // calendar's id is the account's own address — and reading it needs nothing
    // beyond the calendar scope already granted, unlike the userinfo endpoint.
    let account = primary_calendar_id(&issued.access_token);
    let path = match &account {
        Some(account) => account_token_path(state_dir, account),
        None => legacy_token_path(state_dir, endpoint_id),
    };
    save_token(
        &path,
        &StoredToken {
            refresh_token,
            access_token: Some(issued.access_token),
            expires_at: unix_now() + issued.expires_in,
            account: account.clone(),
            client_id: Some(credentials.client_id.clone()),
        },
    )?;
    // The authorisation now lives under the account, so the copy this endpoint
    // used to keep would only shadow it.
    let legacy = legacy_token_path(state_dir, endpoint_id);
    if account.is_some() && legacy.exists() {
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&legacy);
    }
    match &account {
        Some(account) => println!(
            "Authorised {account}. Every endpoint on this account can use it; \
             the refresh token is stored at {}",
            path.display()
        ),
        None => println!("Authorised. Refresh token stored at {}", path.display()),
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// The address of the authorised account, read from its primary calendar.
///
/// Returned as an option rather than an error: failing to name the account only
/// costs the sharing, and the authorisation itself is perfectly good without it.
fn primary_calendar_id(access_token: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let agent: ureq::Agent = ureq::Agent::config_builder()
        .http_status_as_error(false)
        .build()
        .into();
    let mut response = agent
        .get("https://www.googleapis.com/calendar/v3/calendars/primary")
        .header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {access_token}"))
        .call()
        .ok()?;
    if !(200..300).contains(&response.status().as_u16()) {
        return None;
    }
    let body = response.body_mut().read_to_string().ok()?;
    let value: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&body).ok()?;
    value
        .get("id")
        .and_then(|id| id.as_str())
        .map(str::to_string)
}

/// Accepts one loopback request and extracts the authorisation code from it.
fn wait_for_code(listener: &TcpListener, expected_state: &str) -> Result<String, AuthError> {
    let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().map_err(AuthError::Listen)?;
    let target = read_request_target(&stream)?;
    let query = target.split_once('?').map(|(_, query)| query).unwrap_or("");
    let params = parse_query(query);

    let outcome = match (params.get("code"), params.get("error"), params.get("state")) {
        (_, Some(error), _) => Err(AuthError::Denied(error.clone())),
        (Some(_), _, state) if state.map(String::as_str) != Some(expected_state) => {
            Err(AuthError::StateMismatch)
        }
        (Some(code), _, _) => Ok(code.clone()),
        (None, None, _) => Err(AuthError::Redirect(
            "the redirect carried neither a code nor an error".into(),
        )),
    };
    respond(&mut stream, outcome.is_ok());
    outcome
}

fn read_request_target(stream: &TcpStream) -> Result<String, AuthError> {
    let mut line = String::new();
    BufReader::new(stream)
        .read_line(&mut line)
        .map_err(|error| AuthError::Redirect(error.to_string()))?;
    line.split_whitespace()
        .nth(1)
        .map(str::to_string)
        .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::Redirect(format!("could not parse request line {line:?}")))
}

fn respond(stream: &mut TcpStream, success: bool) {
    let body = if success {
        "<h1>calcalist is authorised</h1><p>You can close this tab.</p>"
    } else {
        "<h1>Authorisation failed</h1><p>Check the terminal for details.</p>"
    };
    let response = format!(
        "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{body}",
        body.len()
    );
    // The browser tab is a courtesy; failing to write to it changes nothing.
    let _ = stream.write_all(response.as_bytes());
}

#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct IssuedToken {
    access_token: String,
    #[serde(default)]
    refresh_token: Option<String>,
    #[serde(default = "default_expiry")]
    expires_in: u64,
}

fn default_expiry() -> u64 {
    3600
}

fn post_token(form: &[(&str, &str)]) -> Result<IssuedToken, AuthError> {
    let body = form
        .iter()
        .map(|(key, value)| format!("{}={}", encode(key), encode(value)))
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .join("&");

    let agent: ureq::Agent = ureq::Agent::config_builder()
        .http_status_as_error(false)
        .build()
        .into();
    let mut response = agent
        .post(TOKEN_ENDPOINT)
        .content_type("application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
        .send(&body)
        .map_err(|error| AuthError::Token(error.to_string()))?;

    let status = response.status();
    let text = response
        .body_mut()
        .read_to_string()
        .map_err(|error| AuthError::Token(error.to_string()))?;
    if !status.is_success() {
        return Err(AuthError::Token(format!("HTTP {status}: {text}")));
    }
    serde_json::from_str(&text).map_err(|error| AuthError::Token(error.to_string()))
}

fn load_token(path: &Path) -> Result<Option<StoredToken>, AuthError> {
    let text = match fs::read_to_string(path) {
        Ok(text) => text,
        Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
        Err(source) => {
            return Err(AuthError::Io {
                path: path.to_path_buf(),
                source,
            });
        }
    };
    serde_json::from_str(&text)
        .map(Some)
        .map_err(|source| AuthError::Parse {
            path: path.to_path_buf(),
            source,
        })
}

/// Writes the token readable only by its owner. It is a durable credential, and
/// the state directory may not be private on every system.
fn save_token(path: &Path, token: &StoredToken) -> Result<(), AuthError> {
    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
        fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(|source| AuthError::Io {
            path: parent.to_path_buf(),
            source,
        })?;
        let _ = fs::set_permissions(parent, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700));
    }
    let text = serde_json::to_string_pretty(token).map_err(|source| AuthError::Parse {
        path: path.to_path_buf(),
        source,
    })?;
    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
        .write(true)
        .create(true)
        .truncate(true)
        .mode(0o600)
        .open(path)
        .map_err(|source| AuthError::Io {
            path: path.to_path_buf(),
            source,
        })?;
    file.write_all(text.as_bytes())
        .map_err(|source| AuthError::Io {
            path: path.to_path_buf(),
            source,
        })
}

fn open_in_browser(url: &str) {
    // Best effort: on a headless machine the printed URL is the real interface.
    let _ = Command::new("xdg-open").arg(url).status();
}

fn unix_now() -> u64 {
    SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
        .unwrap_or_default()
        .as_secs()
}

/// 32 bytes of kernel randomness, base64url encoded.
///
/// Reads exactly 32 bytes. `/dev/urandom` is an endless stream, so anything that
/// reads it to completion — `fs::read`, for one — allocates until the machine
/// runs out of memory.
///
/// A failure here is fatal rather than papered over: both callers need
/// unpredictable values, and a guessable `state` or PKCE verifier would defeat
/// the protection they exist to provide.
fn random_token() -> Result<String, AuthError> {
    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
    fs::File::open("/dev/urandom")
        .and_then(|mut file| file.read_exact(&mut bytes))
        .map_err(AuthError::Randomness)?;
    Ok(base64url(&bytes))
}

fn pkce_challenge(verifier: &str) -> String {
    base64url(&Sha256::digest(verifier.as_bytes()))
}

/// Base64 with the URL alphabet and no padding, as RFC 7636 requires.
fn base64url(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
    const ALPHABET: &[u8] = b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_";
    let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len().div_ceil(3) * 4);
    for chunk in bytes.chunks(3) {
        let bits = chunk.iter().enumerate().fold(0u32, |acc, (index, byte)| {
            acc | (u32::from(*byte) << (16 - 8 * index))
        });
        // Three bytes make four characters; a short chunk makes proportionally fewer.
        for index in 0..=chunk.len() {
            let shift = 18 - 6 * index;
            out.push(ALPHABET[((bits >> shift) & 0b11_1111) as usize] as char);
        }
    }
    out
}

fn encode(value: &str) -> String {
    let mut out = String::with_capacity(value.len());
    for byte in value.bytes() {
        match byte {
            b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~' => {
                out.push(byte as char);
            }
            _ => out.push_str(&format!("%{byte:02X}")),
        }
    }
    out
}

fn parse_query(query: &str) -> std::collections::HashMap<String, String> {
    query
        .split('&')
        .filter_map(|pair| pair.split_once('='))
        .map(|(key, value)| (decode(key), decode(value)))
        .collect()
}

fn decode(value: &str) -> String {
    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(value.len());
    let bytes = value.as_bytes();
    let mut index = 0;
    while index < bytes.len() {
        match bytes[index] {
            b'%' if index + 2 < bytes.len() => {
                let hex = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[index + 1..index + 3]).unwrap_or("");
                match u8::from_str_radix(hex, 16) {
                    Ok(byte) => {
                        out.push(byte);
                        index += 3;
                    }
                    Err(_) => {
                        out.push(bytes[index]);
                        index += 1;
                    }
                }
            }
            b'+' => {
                out.push(b' ');
                index += 1;
            }
            byte => {
                out.push(byte);
                index += 1;
            }
        }
    }
    String::from_utf8_lossy(&out).into_owned()
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// RFC 4648 section 10 test vectors, minus the padding RFC 7636 forbids.
    #[test]
    fn base64url_matches_the_specification() {
        assert_eq!(base64url(b""), "");
        assert_eq!(base64url(b"f"), "Zg");
        assert_eq!(base64url(b"fo"), "Zm8");
        assert_eq!(base64url(b"foo"), "Zm9v");
        assert_eq!(base64url(b"foob"), "Zm9vYg");
        assert_eq!(base64url(b"fooba"), "Zm9vYmE");
        assert_eq!(base64url(b"foobar"), "Zm9vYmFy");
    }

    /// The URL alphabet must use - and _ rather than + and /, or Google rejects
    /// the challenge.
    #[test]
    fn base64url_uses_the_url_alphabet() {
        let encoded = base64url(&[0xfb, 0xff, 0xfe]);
        assert!(!encoded.contains('+'), "{encoded}");
        assert!(!encoded.contains('/'), "{encoded}");
        assert!(!encoded.contains('='), "{encoded}");
    }

    /// RFC 7636 appendix B. Getting this wrong fails authorisation with an
    /// unhelpful error, so it is pinned to the published vector.
    #[test]
    fn pkce_challenge_matches_rfc_7636() {
        assert_eq!(
            pkce_challenge("dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"),
            "E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM"
        );
    }

    /// Regression: this previously read /dev/urandom to EOF, which allocates
    /// without bound and takes the machine down with it.
    #[test]
    fn a_verifier_is_long_enough_and_url_safe() {
        let verifier = random_token().expect("randomness should be available");
        assert!(verifier.len() >= 43, "too short for RFC 7636: {verifier}");
        assert!(
            verifier
                .chars()
                .all(|ch| ch.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(ch, '-' | '_')),
            "{verifier}"
        );
        assert_ne!(
            verifier,
            random_token().expect("randomness should be available"),
            "tokens must not repeat"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn percent_encoding_round_trips() {
        for value in ["plain", "with space", "a/b?c=d&e", "sömething", "100%"] {
            assert_eq!(decode(&encode(value)), value, "{value}");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn reserved_characters_are_escaped() {
        assert_eq!(encode("a/b?c=d&e"), "a%2Fb%3Fc%3Dd%26e");
        assert_eq!(encode("a-b_c.d~e"), "a-b_c.d~e");
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_redirect_query_is_parsed() {
        let params = parse_query("code=4%2F0Ab&state=xyz&scope=https%3A%2F%2Fexample");
        assert_eq!(params.get("code").map(String::as_str), Some("4/0Ab"));
        assert_eq!(params.get("state").map(String::as_str), Some("xyz"));
        assert_eq!(
            params.get("scope").map(String::as_str),
            Some("https://example")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_cached_access_token_is_reused_only_while_valid() {
        let fresh = StoredToken {
            refresh_token: "r".into(),
            access_token: Some("a".into()),
            expires_at: unix_now() + 3600,
            account: None,
            client_id: None,
        };
        assert_eq!(fresh.usable_access_token(), Some("a"));

        let expired = StoredToken {
            expires_at: unix_now(),
            ..fresh.clone()
        };
        assert_eq!(expired.usable_access_token(), None);

        // Within the margin it is treated as expired, so it cannot lapse mid-cycle.
        let nearly = StoredToken {
            expires_at: unix_now() + 5,
            ..fresh
        };
        assert_eq!(nearly.usable_access_token(), None);
    }

    fn stored(account: &str, client_id: &str) -> StoredToken {
        StoredToken {
            refresh_token: format!("refresh-for-{account}"),
            access_token: None,
            expires_at: 0,
            account: Some(account.to_string()),
            client_id: Some(client_id.to_string()),
        }
    }

    /// The gap this closes: two endpoints on one account needed a login each,
    /// because the authorisation was filed under the endpoint rather than the
    /// account it actually belongs to.
    #[test]
    fn one_authorisation_serves_every_endpoint_on_that_account() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp");
        save_token(
            &account_token_path(dir.path(), "me@example.com"),
            &stored("me@example.com", "client-a"),
        )
        .expect("save");

        for endpoint in ["work", "personal", "never-logged-in"] {
            let (_, token) = resolve_token(dir.path(), endpoint, None).expect("resolve");
            assert_eq!(token.refresh_token, "refresh-for-me@example.com");
        }
    }

    /// Two accounts cannot be guessed between, so the endpoint has to say.
    #[test]
    fn several_accounts_have_to_be_told_apart() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp");
        for account in ["one@example.com", "two@example.com"] {
            save_token(
                &account_token_path(dir.path(), account),
                &stored(account, "client-a"),
            )
            .expect("save");
        }

        let error = resolve_token(dir.path(), "work", None).expect_err("ambiguous");
        assert!(
            matches!(error, AuthError::AmbiguousAccount { .. }),
            "{error:?}"
        );
        assert!(error.to_string().contains("one@example.com"), "{error}");

        let (_, token) =
            resolve_token(dir.path(), "work", Some("two@example.com")).expect("resolve");
        assert_eq!(token.refresh_token, "refresh-for-two@example.com");
    }

    /// An authorisation written by an earlier version keeps working untouched.
    #[test]
    fn an_authorisation_from_the_old_layout_is_still_honoured() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp");
        save_token(
            &legacy_token_path(dir.path(), "work"),
            &StoredToken {
                refresh_token: "old".into(),
                access_token: None,
                expires_at: 0,
                account: None,
                client_id: None,
            },
        )
        .expect("save");

        let (_, token) = resolve_token(dir.path(), "work", None).expect("resolve");
        assert_eq!(token.refresh_token, "old");
        // A different endpoint has nothing to fall back on.
        let error = resolve_token(dir.path(), "other", None).expect_err("not authorised");
        assert!(matches!(error, AuthError::NotAuthorised(_)), "{error:?}");
    }

    /// A refresh token only works for the client it was issued to, so a changed
    /// client_id has to say so rather than surface as an opaque invalid_grant.
    #[test]
    fn a_token_from_another_oauth_client_is_refused_by_name() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("temp");
        save_token(
            &account_token_path(dir.path(), "me@example.com"),
            &stored("me@example.com", "client-a"),
        )
        .expect("save");

        let credentials = Credentials {
            client_id: "client-b".into(),
            client_secret: "secret".into(),
        };
        let error = access_token(dir.path(), "work", None, &credentials).expect_err("mismatch");
        assert!(
            matches!(error, AuthError::ClientMismatch { .. }),
            "{error:?}"
        );
    }
}