Google requires OAuth for calendar access; app passwords stopped working for
CalDAV, CardDAV and IMAP in March 2025, so there is no simpler path to offer.
- Authorisation code flow over a loopback redirect, which is what Google
supports for desktop clients now the copy-paste flow is gone, with PKCE so an
intercepted code is useless without the verifier. Only the refresh token is
persisted, 0600, in the state directory.
- An expired grant is reported as itself: a consent screen still in Testing has
its refresh tokens expired after 7 days, and "run calcalist google login" is
more use than Google's bare invalid_grant.
- doctor reports whether each Google endpoint is still authorised, since an
installation that worked last week can stop with nothing having changed here.
A webcal URL may now come from a command instead of the config. Google's secret
iCal address grants read access to a whole calendar to anyone holding it, so
writing it into a file described as portable and secret-free was a contradiction.
Fixed a serious defect in the first draft of this module: random_token used
fs::read on /dev/urandom, which reads to end of file. /dev/urandom has no end,
so it allocated until the machine ran out of memory — it took the editor down
with it. It now reads exactly 32 bytes, and a randomness failure is fatal rather
than falling back to the clock, since a guessable state or PKCE verifier defeats
the point of having them.
Verified end to end against a live Posteo CalDAV calendar: pimsync validated the
generated config against the real server, 58 events from a public feed were
mirrored and pushed, and a second run was a no-op.
97 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The core of M1: everything needed to reconcile source calendars against an
aggregate, short of getting events in and out over the network.
- ical: surgical line-level editing. Each logical line keeps a byte range into
the original, so untouched lines are emitted verbatim and only edited ones are
rebuilt. Parsing and re-serialising would drop every property we do not model.
- ical: content hashing excludes DTSTAMP and LAST-MODIFIED. Servers rewrite them
on every store, so hashing them would report a change on every cycle forever.
- provenance: aggregate UIDs derived as blake3(aggregate, source, source_uid),
length-prefixed so field boundaries cannot collide. Deriving rather than
recording makes the state file a cache, and makes our own mirrors recognisable,
which is what stops writes echoing back around.
- mirror: the transforms. An aggregate copy must be scheduling inert, so writing
it never mails invitations for a meeting already invited from its source.
Google can suppress notification and keeps real attendees; CalDAV cannot, so
the guest list is demoted to inert data and a declined meeting is marked
TRANSP:TRANSPARENT. Writing an edit back uses the source as donor for what the
demotion removed, so editing a time cannot silently drop the guests.
- reconcile: pure decision engine. Only the source changed updates the mirror,
only the aggregate changed writes back, both changed keeps the source and logs
a conflict.
- Mass-deletion guard takes an absolute floor as well as a fraction: a share
alone is meaningless at small counts, where deleting the only event is 100%.
- sync refuses to run when an aggregate's configured target differs from the
recorded one, before reconciling. Otherwise the new empty target would read as
an aggregate whose every event was deleted, and delete propagation would then
remove them from every source.
Found by end-to-end testing: writing an item already present under a different
filename created a duplicate rather than replacing it, because filenames are
derived from the UID while pimsync picks its own. Writes now carry the path they
supersede. Covered by a regression test.
79 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Initialise the project per the approved implementation plan (M0).
- Pin the toolchain with devbox: Rust 1.97.1, pimsync 0.5.11, jujutsu 0.44.0,
and radicale 3.7.8 for later integration tests.
- Add the configuration model with full referential validation, reporting
every problem in one pass rather than short-circuiting on the first.
- Add `calcalist doctor`, verifying pimsync's presence and version series,
the state directory, and the configuration.
- Define the whole CLI surface; only `doctor` acts, the rest exit 2 rather
than pretending to work.
- Rewrite SPECS.md: Rust naming conventions in place of the JS/TS style
lines, a `devbox run check` gate instead of a pre-commit hook (jj runs no
git hooks), and the sync semantics the spec previously left unstated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
