Designing the configuration UI in full made the case against building it. Its
audience would be people who find TOML hard, but with bring-your-own OAuth
client settled, every user must first create a Google Cloud project, configure
a consent screen and put a secret in a keyring — a far higher bar than editing
thirty lines of config. Anyone who clears it can edit the file; anyone who
cannot never reaches the file. Against that stood three dependencies, five
modules, an auth.rs refactor and a security surface guarding something that
reads the config and touches the keyring. `doctor` and `status` had already
absorbed most of what it was for. The reasoning is recorded in TODO.md and
SPECS.md rather than left as an apparent oversight.
The run lock is not a UI feature and closes a gap that already existed: nothing
stopped a timer firing into a hand-run cycle, and two cycles interleaving
writes over the same vdirs is what the design otherwise avoids. flock is used
rather than a pid file because the kernel releases it however the process ends,
so a crash cannot leave a lock to clear by hand — which also means a lock we
failed to take is held by a live process, so the pid in it is worth reporting.
The one idea worth keeping from the UI design was collection discovery, which
needed no web layer. `calcalist discover` prints a ready-to-paste endpoint
block per calendar a server offers, removing the most error-prone field in the
config. pimsync's discovery output is undocumented, so the format was
established against a real server first. Two things it teaches: everything
arrives on stdout including failures, and a pair has two storages, so pimsync
reports the scratch vdir's contents too — parsing anchors on the heading naming
the server, or a probe directory's leftovers would be offered as the user's
calendars.
Verified against Posteo as well as Radicale: all four calendars found, the
first matching the URL already configured.
Also fixes a real defect in the test harness rather than its symptom. Ports were
chosen by binding one and letting go, so two tests could pick the same number —
and the loser's readiness check then succeeded against the winner's server,
silently sharing it. Startup now confirms the child we spawned is the one alive,
retries on another port if not, and waits for a real HTTP response rather than
an open socket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eight items were still open at the end of M1: two integration tests that had
only been run by hand, and six known gaps.
Recurrence overrides now reach Google. Google addresses an exception through
the series rather than as an event of its own, so the master is sent first and
each override is then matched to its instance by original start time and
patched. Matching needs the two sides' spellings reduced to one key: iCalendar
writes a zoned local time, Google an absolute offset. An override matching no
occurrence is counted rather than forced — that means a stale RECURRENCE-ID
left behind by an edited RRULE, and inventing an event for it would put
something in the calendar the series does not contain.
Reading one component apart from another needed a view `properties` cannot
give: it flattens every VEVENT together, which is right for the UID a series
shares and wrong for an override, whose SUMMARY and the master's are then
indistinguishable. `Calendar::events` splits them.
A TZID now travels with the VTIMEZONE that defines it, derived from the zone's
own transition table as the yearly rule it implies. This changes the content
hash of every zoned recurring event, so the first cycle after this re-pushes
them.
A Google authorisation is filed under the account it was granted for rather
than the endpoint that asked for it, so two endpoints on one account no longer
need a login each. The account is read from the primary calendar's id, which
needs no scope beyond the calendar one already granted. Authorisations written
by the previous scheme are still honoured, and move across at the next login.
An unreachable Google endpoint no longer ends the cycle — one lapsed token used
to stop the CalDAV side too. It is named, only the aggregates depending on it
stand down, and the run exits non-zero so a partial cycle cannot pass for
success. The CalDAV leg cannot be narrowed the same way: pimsync is one process
covering every pair, so a failure does not say which pair it belongs to.
`--dry-run` now pulls for real, into a throwaway copy of the local mirrors and
through a pimsync configuration that only ever reads from a server. What it
reports is measured against the calendars as they are now rather than against
whatever the last real cycle left behind.
`calcalist prune` reports local mirrors of endpoints the configuration no
longer names, and removes them under --force.
The integration tests run against a real Radicale server and a real iCal feed:
convergence and idempotence, the dry run, prune, and the scheduling rule
asserted on the bytes that actually reached the server. The plan asked for an
SMTP sink for that last one; Radicale implements no RFC 6638 scheduling, so a
quiet SMTP port would have proved nothing about the transform.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Google requires OAuth for calendar access; app passwords stopped working for
CalDAV, CardDAV and IMAP in March 2025, so there is no simpler path to offer.
- Authorisation code flow over a loopback redirect, which is what Google
supports for desktop clients now the copy-paste flow is gone, with PKCE so an
intercepted code is useless without the verifier. Only the refresh token is
persisted, 0600, in the state directory.
- An expired grant is reported as itself: a consent screen still in Testing has
its refresh tokens expired after 7 days, and "run calcalist google login" is
more use than Google's bare invalid_grant.
- doctor reports whether each Google endpoint is still authorised, since an
installation that worked last week can stop with nothing having changed here.
A webcal URL may now come from a command instead of the config. Google's secret
iCal address grants read access to a whole calendar to anyone holding it, so
writing it into a file described as portable and secret-free was a contradiction.
Fixed a serious defect in the first draft of this module: random_token used
fs::read on /dev/urandom, which reads to end of file. /dev/urandom has no end,
so it allocated until the machine ran out of memory — it took the editor down
with it. It now reads exactly 32 bytes, and a randomness failure is fatal rather
than falling back to the clock, since a guessable state or PKCE verifier defeats
the point of having them.
Verified end to end against a live Posteo CalDAV calendar: pimsync validated the
generated config against the real server, 58 events from a public feed were
mirrored and pushed, and a second run was a no-op.
97 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generates pimsync's configuration from calcalist.toml and invokes it one-shot
either side of the reconcile step: pull first so the reconciler sees one
consistent snapshot, push afterwards to publish what it decided. Its daemon
mode stays unused because it would write the same vdirs the reconciler reads.
- Endpoints are mapped with pimsync's collection blocks, matching a local vdir
subdirectory to an exact remote path. Matching by collection id instead would
have tied our directory names to whatever the server's URL segments happen to
be, and two calendars ending in the same segment would collide.
- The remote is storage_a with conflict_resolution keep a, so a concurrent
server-side change wins over a local one calcalist has not yet reconciled.
Nothing is lost: the next cycle sees the server's version and decides properly.
- on_empty skip and on_delete skip on every pair, so a failed pull is not
mirrored as a mass deletion.
- Secrets stay out of the portable config: pimsync is given the same command
calcalist would run to fetch them.
- Google endpoints are omitted entirely, since pimsync can reach neither its REST
API nor its CalDAV endpoint.
doctor now asks pimsync to validate the generated config. pimsync is pre-1.0 and
its parser does not always match its documentation, so asking it is the only
reliable check — a parse rejection is reported as a failure, an unreachable
server only as a warning.
Found while testing against the real binary: pimsync 0.5.11 documents read_only
as applying to every storage type but rejects it on a webcal storage, with only
"Could not parse file" to go on. Dropped; it was redundant beside one_way.
Verified end to end against a live Radicale server and an HTTP-served feed: the
feed synced in, mirrored with a derived UID and provenance, and pushed to the
server; repeated runs are no-ops and adding one feed event mirrors exactly one.
87 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Initialise the project per the approved implementation plan (M0).
- Pin the toolchain with devbox: Rust 1.97.1, pimsync 0.5.11, jujutsu 0.44.0,
and radicale 3.7.8 for later integration tests.
- Add the configuration model with full referential validation, reporting
every problem in one pass rather than short-circuiting on the first.
- Add `calcalist doctor`, verifying pimsync's presence and version series,
the state directory, and the configuration.
- Define the whole CLI surface; only `doctor` acts, the rest exit 2 rather
than pretending to work.
- Rewrite SPECS.md: Rust naming conventions in place of the JS/TS style
lines, a `devbox run check` gate instead of a pre-commit hook (jj runs no
git hooks), and the sync semantics the spec previously left unstated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
