Finish M2: run lock, systemd units, discover; drop the web UI

Designing the configuration UI in full made the case against building it. Its
audience would be people who find TOML hard, but with bring-your-own OAuth
client settled, every user must first create a Google Cloud project, configure
a consent screen and put a secret in a keyring — a far higher bar than editing
thirty lines of config. Anyone who clears it can edit the file; anyone who
cannot never reaches the file. Against that stood three dependencies, five
modules, an auth.rs refactor and a security surface guarding something that
reads the config and touches the keyring. `doctor` and `status` had already
absorbed most of what it was for. The reasoning is recorded in TODO.md and
SPECS.md rather than left as an apparent oversight.

The run lock is not a UI feature and closes a gap that already existed: nothing
stopped a timer firing into a hand-run cycle, and two cycles interleaving
writes over the same vdirs is what the design otherwise avoids. flock is used
rather than a pid file because the kernel releases it however the process ends,
so a crash cannot leave a lock to clear by hand — which also means a lock we
failed to take is held by a live process, so the pid in it is worth reporting.

The one idea worth keeping from the UI design was collection discovery, which
needed no web layer. `calcalist discover` prints a ready-to-paste endpoint
block per calendar a server offers, removing the most error-prone field in the
config. pimsync's discovery output is undocumented, so the format was
established against a real server first. Two things it teaches: everything
arrives on stdout including failures, and a pair has two storages, so pimsync
reports the scratch vdir's contents too — parsing anchors on the heading naming
the server, or a probe directory's leftovers would be offered as the user's
calendars.

Verified against Posteo as well as Radicale: all four calendars found, the
first matching the URL already configured.

Also fixes a real defect in the test harness rather than its symptom. Ports were
chosen by binding one and letting go, so two tests could pick the same number —
and the loser's readiness check then succeeded against the winner's server,
silently sharing it. Startup now confirms the child we spawned is the one alive,
retries on another port if not, and waits for a real HTTP response rather than
an open socket.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
randogoth 2026-09-10 16:17:34 +03:00
parent 47ad8b4c47
commit ef6482ed62
13 changed files with 808 additions and 92 deletions

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systemd/calcalist.service Normal file
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[Unit]
Description=Synchronise calendars with calcalist
[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=%h/.local/bin/calcalist sync
NoNewPrivileges=true
# Deliberately no ProtectSystem, PrivateTmp or IPC sandboxing. Credentials come
# from commands like `secret-tool`, which need the session keyring over D-Bus,
# and those options break them in ways that surface as unexplained auth
# failures rather than as anything pointing at the sandbox.
# A cycle that could not reach an endpoint exits non-zero on purpose, so a
# lapsed token shows up as a failed unit rather than passing unnoticed.

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systemd/calcalist.timer Normal file
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[Unit]
Description=Synchronise calendars with calcalist every 15 minutes
[Timer]
OnBootSec=2m
OnUnitActiveSec=15m
Persistent=true
# Spreads requests instead of every installation calling Google on the quarter
# hour. Google's Calendar API quota is per project and enforced per minute, and
# its own guidance is to randomise timing rather than to burst.
RandomizedDelaySec=120
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target