CalCalist/Cargo.toml

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[package]
name = "calcalist"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"
rust-version = "1.97"
description = "Aggregate and sync events between CalDAV, Google Calendar and iCal feeds"
publish = false
[dependencies]
Add the aggregation engine and a local sync cycle The core of M1: everything needed to reconcile source calendars against an aggregate, short of getting events in and out over the network. - ical: surgical line-level editing. Each logical line keeps a byte range into the original, so untouched lines are emitted verbatim and only edited ones are rebuilt. Parsing and re-serialising would drop every property we do not model. - ical: content hashing excludes DTSTAMP and LAST-MODIFIED. Servers rewrite them on every store, so hashing them would report a change on every cycle forever. - provenance: aggregate UIDs derived as blake3(aggregate, source, source_uid), length-prefixed so field boundaries cannot collide. Deriving rather than recording makes the state file a cache, and makes our own mirrors recognisable, which is what stops writes echoing back around. - mirror: the transforms. An aggregate copy must be scheduling inert, so writing it never mails invitations for a meeting already invited from its source. Google can suppress notification and keeps real attendees; CalDAV cannot, so the guest list is demoted to inert data and a declined meeting is marked TRANSP:TRANSPARENT. Writing an edit back uses the source as donor for what the demotion removed, so editing a time cannot silently drop the guests. - reconcile: pure decision engine. Only the source changed updates the mirror, only the aggregate changed writes back, both changed keeps the source and logs a conflict. - Mass-deletion guard takes an absolute floor as well as a fraction: a share alone is meaningless at small counts, where deleting the only event is 100%. - sync refuses to run when an aggregate's configured target differs from the recorded one, before reconciling. Otherwise the new empty target would read as an aggregate whose every event was deleted, and delete propagation would then remove them from every source. Found by end-to-end testing: writing an item already present under a different filename created a duplicate rather than replacing it, because filenames are derived from the UID while pimsync picks its own. Writes now carry the path they supersede. Covered by a regression test. 79 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 09:55:06 +03:00
blake3 = "1.8"
clap = { version = "4.6", features = ["derive"] }
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
Add the aggregation engine and a local sync cycle The core of M1: everything needed to reconcile source calendars against an aggregate, short of getting events in and out over the network. - ical: surgical line-level editing. Each logical line keeps a byte range into the original, so untouched lines are emitted verbatim and only edited ones are rebuilt. Parsing and re-serialising would drop every property we do not model. - ical: content hashing excludes DTSTAMP and LAST-MODIFIED. Servers rewrite them on every store, so hashing them would report a change on every cycle forever. - provenance: aggregate UIDs derived as blake3(aggregate, source, source_uid), length-prefixed so field boundaries cannot collide. Deriving rather than recording makes the state file a cache, and makes our own mirrors recognisable, which is what stops writes echoing back around. - mirror: the transforms. An aggregate copy must be scheduling inert, so writing it never mails invitations for a meeting already invited from its source. Google can suppress notification and keeps real attendees; CalDAV cannot, so the guest list is demoted to inert data and a declined meeting is marked TRANSP:TRANSPARENT. Writing an edit back uses the source as donor for what the demotion removed, so editing a time cannot silently drop the guests. - reconcile: pure decision engine. Only the source changed updates the mirror, only the aggregate changed writes back, both changed keeps the source and logs a conflict. - Mass-deletion guard takes an absolute floor as well as a fraction: a share alone is meaningless at small counts, where deleting the only event is 100%. - sync refuses to run when an aggregate's configured target differs from the recorded one, before reconciling. Otherwise the new empty target would read as an aggregate whose every event was deleted, and delete propagation would then remove them from every source. Found by end-to-end testing: writing an item already present under a different filename created a duplicate rather than replacing it, because filenames are derived from the UID while pimsync picks its own. Writes now carry the path they supersede. Covered by a regression test. 79 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 09:55:06 +03:00
serde_json = "1.0"
Add Google OAuth, and let feed URLs come from a secret command Google requires OAuth for calendar access; app passwords stopped working for CalDAV, CardDAV and IMAP in March 2025, so there is no simpler path to offer. - Authorisation code flow over a loopback redirect, which is what Google supports for desktop clients now the copy-paste flow is gone, with PKCE so an intercepted code is useless without the verifier. Only the refresh token is persisted, 0600, in the state directory. - An expired grant is reported as itself: a consent screen still in Testing has its refresh tokens expired after 7 days, and "run calcalist google login" is more use than Google's bare invalid_grant. - doctor reports whether each Google endpoint is still authorised, since an installation that worked last week can stop with nothing having changed here. A webcal URL may now come from a command instead of the config. Google's secret iCal address grants read access to a whole calendar to anyone holding it, so writing it into a file described as portable and secret-free was a contradiction. Fixed a serious defect in the first draft of this module: random_token used fs::read on /dev/urandom, which reads to end of file. /dev/urandom has no end, so it allocated until the machine ran out of memory — it took the editor down with it. It now reads exactly 32 bytes, and a randomness failure is fatal rather than falling back to the clock, since a guessable state or PKCE verifier defeats the point of having them. Verified end to end against a live Posteo CalDAV calendar: pimsync validated the generated config against the real server, 58 events from a public feed were mirrored and pushed, and a second run was a no-op. 97 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 12:40:47 +03:00
sha2 = "0.11"
thiserror = "2.0"
toml = "1.1"
Add Google OAuth, and let feed URLs come from a secret command Google requires OAuth for calendar access; app passwords stopped working for CalDAV, CardDAV and IMAP in March 2025, so there is no simpler path to offer. - Authorisation code flow over a loopback redirect, which is what Google supports for desktop clients now the copy-paste flow is gone, with PKCE so an intercepted code is useless without the verifier. Only the refresh token is persisted, 0600, in the state directory. - An expired grant is reported as itself: a consent screen still in Testing has its refresh tokens expired after 7 days, and "run calcalist google login" is more use than Google's bare invalid_grant. - doctor reports whether each Google endpoint is still authorised, since an installation that worked last week can stop with nothing having changed here. A webcal URL may now come from a command instead of the config. Google's secret iCal address grants read access to a whole calendar to anyone holding it, so writing it into a file described as portable and secret-free was a contradiction. Fixed a serious defect in the first draft of this module: random_token used fs::read on /dev/urandom, which reads to end of file. /dev/urandom has no end, so it allocated until the machine ran out of memory — it took the editor down with it. It now reads exactly 32 bytes, and a randomness failure is fatal rather than falling back to the clock, since a guessable state or PKCE verifier defeats the point of having them. Verified end to end against a live Posteo CalDAV calendar: pimsync validated the generated config against the real server, 58 events from a public feed were mirrored and pushed, and a second run was a no-op. 97 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 12:40:47 +03:00
ureq = { version = "3.4", default-features = false, features = ["json", "rustls", "gzip"] }
Add the aggregation engine and a local sync cycle The core of M1: everything needed to reconcile source calendars against an aggregate, short of getting events in and out over the network. - ical: surgical line-level editing. Each logical line keeps a byte range into the original, so untouched lines are emitted verbatim and only edited ones are rebuilt. Parsing and re-serialising would drop every property we do not model. - ical: content hashing excludes DTSTAMP and LAST-MODIFIED. Servers rewrite them on every store, so hashing them would report a change on every cycle forever. - provenance: aggregate UIDs derived as blake3(aggregate, source, source_uid), length-prefixed so field boundaries cannot collide. Deriving rather than recording makes the state file a cache, and makes our own mirrors recognisable, which is what stops writes echoing back around. - mirror: the transforms. An aggregate copy must be scheduling inert, so writing it never mails invitations for a meeting already invited from its source. Google can suppress notification and keeps real attendees; CalDAV cannot, so the guest list is demoted to inert data and a declined meeting is marked TRANSP:TRANSPARENT. Writing an edit back uses the source as donor for what the demotion removed, so editing a time cannot silently drop the guests. - reconcile: pure decision engine. Only the source changed updates the mirror, only the aggregate changed writes back, both changed keeps the source and logs a conflict. - Mass-deletion guard takes an absolute floor as well as a fraction: a share alone is meaningless at small counts, where deleting the only event is 100%. - sync refuses to run when an aggregate's configured target differs from the recorded one, before reconciling. Otherwise the new empty target would read as an aggregate whose every event was deleted, and delete propagation would then remove them from every source. Found by end-to-end testing: writing an item already present under a different filename created a duplicate rather than replacing it, because filenames are derived from the UID while pimsync picks its own. Writes now carry the path they supersede. Covered by a regression test. 79 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 09:55:06 +03:00
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"
[lints.rust]
unsafe_code = "forbid"